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Financing early-stage ventures: the role of uncertainty and financial markets in the 
investment choices of venture capitalists  
 
 
Introduction 
The venture capital financing of firms according to their stage of development has 
been the object of a number of empirical works in recent years (Ruhnka and Young 1991; 
Carter and Van Auken 1994; Elango, Fried, Hisrich, and Poloncheck 1995, Seppä and 
Laamanen 2001; Pintado, Pérez de Lema, and Van Auken 2007). However, few works have 
specifically focused upon the reasons which drive a venture capitalist to alter, in time, the 
allocation of his or her investment portfolio between “early-stage” ventures, that is investment 
in young – and generally small – unquoted firms and “later-stage” ventures, that is investment 
in more mature (and larger) unquoted firms. This kind of question is nevertheless central if we 
try to understand the problems of rationing undergone during the last decade by early stage 
firms on behalf of venture capitalists to the detriment of more mature companies. 
The aim of this paper is to show that the funds obtained by venture capital-backed 
companies at different stages of development strongly depend on a “portfolio failure 
avoidance strategy” adopted by venture capitalists. We show that this strategy is a rational 
behavior for venture capitalists seeking to invest in a decision-making environment 
characterized not only by asymmetric information but also by strong uncertainty. This 
strategy leads venture capitalists to make a trade-off between early and later-stage 
investments. The paper is organized as follows.  
First, we recall why the financing relationship between venture capitalists and venture 
capital-backed firms is characterized by strong uncertainty. We also recall why the level of 
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informational opacity and of risk is higher for early stage firms than for businesses reaching 
later stages of development. 
Secondly, we develop a model formalizing the investment behavior of venture 
capitalists. This model is founded on analytical tools drawn from two areas of research: the 
theoretical literature on bounded rationality and the empirical literature on decision-making 
under uncertainty (in particular results found by cognitive psychologists). This sheds light on 
the reasons for which a rational venture capitalist, by adopting a rule-governed behavior, 
decides to reallocate his or her portfolio from later to early-stage investment. This model also 
explains why, during certain periods, there is a strong correlation between the performance of 
financial markets (an economic indicator frequently considered as a central determinant of 
venture capital) and the funds invested in early stage ventures while, during other periods, the 
performance of financial markets does not affect the amount of venture capital invested in 
these firms.   
Finally, we develop a statistical analysis of the United States venture capital industry. 
Some hypotheses inferred from our theoretical model and, notably, the existence of 
successive periods of “easy financing” and “lasting rationing” for early stage firms, are tested 
and empirically validated.  
 
1. Risk, uncertainty and the early-stage/later-stage trade-off 
Venture capital is typically defined as the investment by professional investors of 
long-term, equity finance in new firms where the primary reward is a possible capital gain, 
supplemented by dividend yield. Venture capital investments are made in companies not 
quoted on stock markets, where the investor trades-off the short term illiquidity in the shares 
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held for the prospects of a greater future return (Wright and Robbie 1998; Gompers and 
Lerner 2001). 
According to most works on venture capital, venture capital backed companies are 
characterized by the problems of informational asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, 
where there is a need for relatively close monitoring (Tykvova 2007). The tools that venture 
capital firms have to address these information issues are to scrutinize firms intensively before 
providing capital and then to monitor them afterwards. The monitoring and information tools 
include: meting out financing in discrete stages over time (Sahlman 1990); syndicating 
investments with other capital firms (Gompers and Lerner 2004; Manigart et al. 2006; Lerner 
1994); taking seats on a firm’s board of directors (Lerner, 1995); and compensation 
arrangements including stock options (Sahlman 1990). 
A key feature of the works under asymmetric information is their assumption that 
venture capitalists investment decisions are made under risk: the venture capitalist (and the 
entrepreneur) while not knowing which specific outcome will result from a decision, know all 
of the possible outcomes of the decision as well as the probability of occurrence attached to 
each such outcome. However, venture capital involves the financing of firms which contrast 
in many informational ways to established companies quoted on a stock market. This implies 
that venture capital is distinct from other forms of corporate finance in several ways. 
First, the venture capitalist trades-off the short-term illiquidity in the shares held for 
the prospects of a greater future return. Second, the portfolios of venture capitalists are likely 
to be relatively undiversified compared to those of institutional investors. Third, venture 
capital is particularly appropriate in a specific subset of firms which have non-redeployable or 
highly specialised assets (Wright and Robbie 1998). Finally, venture capitalists can essentially 
be viewed as seeking a return on their specific and distinctive skills in identifying, investing 
and monitoring new and/or radically changing firms (such as management buy-outs and buy-
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ins undergoing restructuring). When a business concept involves a new product or service, for 
example, both the investee and the VC can only have opinions about crucial factors such as 
the degree of future market acceptance of the product or service, or how quickly competitors 
may arise. This is particularly true for companies whose performance is difficult to assess 
such as high technology companies with a high reliance on R&D (Gompers and Lerner 2001). 
Investing in new ventures thus involves a high risk of failure. As pointed out by Ruhnka and 
Young (1991), a popular rule of thumb in venture capital industry is that about 30 percent of 
venture capital investees will ultimately be “winners”, another 30 percent will be “living 
dead” 1. The remaining 40 percent will be “losers” losing some or all of the investment.  
Venture capitalists investment decisions are thus made under uncertainty rather than 
under risk: the venture capitalist knows the possible outcomes of a decision, but, generally has 
no way of knowing the probability of occurrence of each outcome. In this uncertain decision-
making environment, the risk reduction strategies of venture capitalists can be appreciably 
different from the ones used to reduce asymmetric risk. For any investor, an usual way of 
dealing with uncertainty is to move towards “less risky” assets when an unexpected adverse 
event occurs. For a venture capitalist, this “portfolio failure avoidance strategy” (Ruhnka and 
Young 1991) consists of allocating a larger proportion of portfolio funds to “safer” 
investments that have a higher probability of achieving positive returns and also of producing 
earlier cash flow.  
This type of strategy can drive venture capitalists to modify the diversification of their 
portfolios in terms of investees’ stages of development. The life-cycle of venture capital-
backed companies is frequently modeled as a sequential series of stages. Companies are seen 
to advance gradually from the seed stage to the start-up stage, then to the third stage, to the 
                                                 
1
 “Living dead” companies stay alive and progress modestly, but their shares remain illiquid and they are not 
able any more to raise additional venture capital financing because they fail to meet the expected 25-35% 
portfolio target rate of return.  
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fourth stage, and so on, to finally reach the exit stage. At the exit stage, the shares of the 
company become liquid in a public offering or a trade sale. 
However, as Berger and Udell (1998) point out, the degree of informational opacity is 
a key feature that distinguishes small business finance from large business finance. In the first 
stages of development, small businesses, such as “seed stage” or “start-up” ventures, typically 
do not have audited financial statements, do not have many business assets that can be easily 
evaluated or pledged as collateral, and have little repayment history or record of profitability 
upon which external suppliers of funds can rely2. 
In these circumstances, it is likely that the risk of loss associated with venture capital 
investment decreases steadily as the venture reaches later stages of development. This 
particular point is analyzed in depth by Ruhnka and Young (1991) who underline that risk 
estimates for early stage ventures include all the probable risks that a venture will face, both 
internal and external, up to the exit stage. Internal risks are for instance poor management, the 
impossibility to produce a workable prototype or to attract funding for next stage or to achieve 
adequate profit margin. External (or market-determined) risks are for example the emergence 
of competitors, technological shifts, or economic downturn that slow market growth or 
prevent initial public offerings. External risks are in many cases uncontrollable for the venture 
capitalist. According to Ruhnka and Young, this distinction between internal and external risk 
is crucial: it explains why the decline in aggregate risk over the successive stages of 
development is entirely due to reductions in internally determined risks. These reductions 
occur when ventures through time overcome technical problems, build management 
competencies, etc. The anticipated external competitive risks that a venture will face in the 
later stages of its development are embedded in the aggregate risk expectations for its earlier 
                                                 
2
 For such early-stage firms, outsiders often put considerable weight on the creditworthiness and reputation of 
the entrepreneur, who may have a longer credit history, more pledgeable assets, and personal data that are easier 
to evaluate than the records of the firm.  
7 
 
stages of development, but do not begin to predominate considerably until the later stages of 
development, when the venture really gets exposed to competitive market forces.  
Empirically, the risk-return profile of such staged investments has been studied with 
survey and interview methods (Wetzel 1981; Ruhnka and Young 1991; Chiampou and Kallett 
1989). These studies show that the risk of loss associated with venture capital investment 
decreases steadily as the venture reaches later stages of development. Also the venture 
capitalists’ rate of return requirement has been found to decline in a similar fashion. 
These results have been confirmed by more recent studies: Seppä and Laamanen 
(2001), using the valuation data of 421 venture capital transactions, found that early-stage 
ventures have higher implied risk and higher implied volatility of the returns than more 
established ones. Manigart et al (2002), with a sample of 200 venture capital companies 
located in five countries, found that on average, venture capitalists require a return between 
36 percent and 45 percent for early-stage investments and between 26 percent and 30 percent 
for expansion later-stage investments such as acquisitions and buyouts. Stage-specific-
required rates of return reported are comparable to those in Elango et al. (1995) who found a 
42 percent rate of return for early-stage investments and 33 percent for later-stage 
investments. 
All these results lead us to suppose that, in an uncertain decision-making environment, 
a reallocation of their portfolio from “higher-risk / early-stage” to “lower-risk / later-stage” 
investments can be a rational response adopted by venture capitalists confronted with the 
occurrence of an unexpected adverse event. The next section is devoted to a very simple 
formalization of this idea, founding our argument on results drawn from two areas of 
research: theoretical literature on bounded rationality and the empirical literature on decision-
making under uncertainty (in particular results found by cognitive psychologists).  
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2. Modeling the portfolio choices of venture capitalists in an uncertain environment 
We develop below a simple model formalizing the investment behavior of venture 
capitalists under uncertainty (2.1). Then the dynamics of the model is studied focusing on the 
rational behaviors adopted by venture capitalists when confronted with an unexpected adverse 
shock in financial markets (2.2). 
 
2.1. The Reliability Condition 
Consider a venture capitalist (VC) that must choose an optimal portfolio diversification 
among (riskier) early-stage ventures and (safer) later-stage ventures. Because of the uncertain 
decision-making investment environment, we suppose, following Heiner (1983), that there is 
a competence-difficulty (« C-D ») gap between the venture capitalist competence and the 
complexity of the decision problem 3. We assume that initially, the VC is limited to a fixed 
repertoire of “lower-risk” actions. More precisely, there is only one action possible in the 
VC’s repertoire: “Investing in later stage ventures”. The problem faced by our VC is the 
following: in what circumstances, would it be rational to raise the proportion of “higher-risk” 
early-stage investments in portfolio? In other words, will this greater flexibility to select an 
additional action improve the VC’s portfolio performance? 
In certain conditions, the new action (investing in early-stage) will take preference 
over the initial action in the VC’s repertoire (the “right” time to select the new action), but 
otherwise it will be less favored than this initial action (the “wrong” time to select the new 
                                                 
3
 Ronald Heiner (1983) has proposed a theory of predictable behavior which has its roots in what Heiner labels a 
competence-difficulty (C-D) gap. This gap is a measure of the spread between an economic agent’s competence 
to make an optimizing decision and the difficulty of the decision problem. Heiner argues that as the C-D gap 
widens, the agent is increasingly likely to follow rule-governed behavior, and it is this rule-governed behavior 
that produces observed regularities in economic behavior. If there is no C-D gap, Heiner argues that rule-
governed behavior would disappear and, along with it, the observed regularities. Instead, unpredictable behavior, 
characterized by constant perturbation, would replace predictable behavior. 
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action). The probabilities of the right or wrong time to select the new action are written as Π 
and (1 - Π) respectively. 
Because of uncertainty, the VC will not necessarily select the new action when it is the 
right time to do so. The conditional probability of selecting the action when it is actually the 
right time is written r. When this happens, the resulting gain in performance (compared to 
staying within the initial repertoire) is written g. Similarly, the conditional probability of 
selecting the new action when it is actually the wrong time is written w, with consequent loss 
in performance of l. 
Let E be the action: “Investing in early-stage ventures”. The VC chooses to enlarge its 
repertoire of actions to the riskier action E, that is to invest in early-stage if and only if: 
⇔ Π r g > (1 - Π) w l          (1) 
The left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected gain from allowing 
flexibility to select another action; the right-hand side the expected loss on allowing the action 
to be selected. Hence, simple rearrangement yields the following Reliability Condition: 
(r/w) > (l/g)[(1- Π)/Π]            (2) 
Or, in a more condensed way,  
ρ > T             (2’) 
Where ρ = (r/w) is a reliability ratio which measures the probability of “correctly” 
responding under the right circumstances relative to the probability of “mistakenly” 
responding under the wrong circumstances. This ratio can be interpreted as the confidence of 
the VC in its investment choices. More precisely this ratio measures the level of confidence 
with which the VC decides to widen its repertoire of actions to early-stage ventures. 
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T = (l/g)[(1- Π)/Π] represents a threshold or tolerance limit which the reliability ratio 
must satisfy. 
Finally, if ρ > T the VC will have a “flexible” or “accommodative” behavior toward 
demands for financing from early-stage ventures. That is to say it will take into consideration 
investment opportunities both in later-stage and in early-stage ventures.  
On the other hand, if ρ < T the VC will adopt a “rigid” behavior: it will only take into 
account “lower risk” investment opportunities in later-stage ventures and will ignore “higher 
risk” investment opportunities in early-stage ventures. 
 
2.2. Understanding the venture capitalist’s portfolio reallocation in the presence of 
uncertainty  
Let us now examine the main factors influencing each side of the reliability condition, 
beginning by the right-hand side. For a given (l/g), the threshold T depends on probability (1- 
Π) which measures the probability of “wrong” circumstances for investing in the early-stage 
ventures.  
Empirical studies have identified several potential determinants of venture capital 
investments: initial public offerings, stock market opportunities, GDP, the basic legal and tax 
structures (such as the Corporate Gains tax rate in US), the labor market legislation, the level 
and growth of pension funds, industrial and academic R&D expenditures, the level of interest 
rates (See for instance Jeng and Wells 2000; Romain and Van Pottelsberghe 2004). An 
unexpected adverse evolution of any of these determinants is thus a “wrong” circumstance for 
investing in early-stage. 
In this paper, we choose to focus on one of these factors: the financial market 
performance. To understand the influence of financial markets on venture capital activity, it is 
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useful to explicit what Gompers and Lerner (2001) call the “venture cycle”: “The venture 
capital cycle starts with raising a venture fund; proceeds through the investment in, 
monitoring of, and adding value to firms; continues as the venture capital exits successful 
deals and returns capital to its investors; and renews itself with the venture capitalist raising 
additional funds” (Gompers and Lerner 2001, p. 152). 
The exit phase is crucial since it enables one to measure the value created by the 
different mechanisms of screening, expertise and monitoring set up by the venture capitalist.  
There are five principal types of venture capital exits (Cumming and MacIntosh 2003): 
(i) listing the company through an IPO, in which a significant portion of the firm is sold into 
the public market; (ii) an acquisition by industrial trade buyers, in which the entire firm is 
bought by a third party; (iii) a secondary sale, often a financial buyout by other private equity 
firms; (iv) a buyback, in which the VC’s shares are repurchased by the entrepreneurs; and, (v) 
a write-off, in which the VC walks away from the investment.  
There is a general belief in academic literature that going public is the most profitable 
and prestigious exit route for venture capitalists (for example Black and Gilson 1998; Jeng 
and Wells 2000; Barnes, Cahill and McCarthy 2003). In the venture capital industry, bringing 
a company public is a signal of success for the venture capital firm backing the issuing 
company. Apart from the obvious profitability measure, VCs typically measure their success 
in terms of the number of companies they have taken public (Barnes, Cahill and McCarthy 
and McCarthy 2003). Jeng and Wells (2000) found that IPOs are the strongest driver of VC 
investing. Black and Gilson (1998) state that US venture capital funds earned on average 60 
percent annual return on investment in IPO exits, compared to 15 percent on acquisition exits. 
A similar result is found by a study of Venture Economics (1988). 
A period of favorable evolution of financial markets can thus be considered as a “right 
time” to invest in early-stage ventures. On the contrary, an unexpected adverse shock (such as 
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a financial crash or more generally a slump of a reference index) on financial markets is 
typically a “wrong” circumstance for investing in the early-stage. In our reasoning, we will 
thus consider that (1- Π) is the probability that financial markets undergo a slump. 
The state of knowledge with regard to this probability is far from being complete. 
Venture capitalists know only that there is a small but finite probability that such sharp drop 
in financial markets can happen. However, like other financial market participants, they do 
not have sufficient evidence to infer this probability from the historical record. Moreover, 
such a dramatic event occurs so infrequently that it may be disregarded with impunity by 
investors for long periods. 
As underlined by Guttentag and Herring (1984, 1999), a pertinent way to study this kind 
of low-probability, high-loss phenomenon is to refer to concepts and methods developed by 
cognitive psychologists4. Two of the heuristics the latter have found – the availability 
heuristic and the threshold heuristic – provide interesting insights into the behavior of 
investors confronted with uncertainty. 
The availability heuristic is a psychological mechanism by which people evaluate the 
likelihood of an event. In the terminology of Kahneman and Tversky (1982, p. 164), the 
“availability heuristic” is employed whenever a person “estimates frequency or probability by 
the ease with which instances or associations can be brought to mind”. Frequent events are 
usually easier to recall than infrequent events. But ease of recall is also affected by other 
factors such as the time elapsed since the last occurrence. These factors can give rise to an 
availability bias. A commonplace example of this phenomenon is the behavior of a driver who 
has just witnessed an automobile accident. The driver’s immediate response is to drive much 
more cautiously, as if the probability of an accident had suddenly increased. But gradually, as 
                                                 
4
 Guttentag and Herring analyze the accuracy of credit models with special emphasis on the difficulty for banks 
of estimating low-frequency, high severity losses. 
13 
 
time passes and the image of the accident recedes from memory, caution declines. The 
tendency for the subjective probability (as evaluated by the agent) to decline during long 
periods in which no disaster has occurred is termed “disaster myopia”.  
At some point, long after the occurrence of a disaster, the subjective probability of the 
recurrence of a disaster may become so low that it is treated as if it were zero. This is an 
example of the “threshold heuristic” – an implicit rule through which decision-makers 
allocate one of their scarcest resources – managerial attention.    
In our model, the automobile accident takes the form of a sharp drop of a financial 
markets’ performance index. In the event of such an adverse shock, the subjective probability 
(1- Π) that financial markets may once again suffer a slump (that is, the probability of 
“wrong” circumstances for investing in the early-stage) will rise. Another expected 
implication of the availability heuristic is that the VC’s subjective probability will quite likely 
overshoot the true probability of the occurrence of a new drop in the performance of financial 
markets5.    
The increase in probability (1- Π) induces a rise in the tolerance limit T. If this rise is 
sufficiently important, the reliability condition writes ρ < T: VCs will ignore investment 
opportunities in early-stage ventures. As long as this situation continues, early-stage ventures 
may suffer from a strong rationing in venture capital markets. 
We thus formulate the following assumption:  
H1 (“availability heuristic”): When an unexpected adverse shock occurs in financial 
markets, VCs will tend to decrease the proportion of early-stage ventures in their investment 
portfolio. In other words, during a post-crisis period, a positive correlation between the 
                                                 
5
 See Guttentag and Herring (1984) for an application of this theory to the credit market. 
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performance of financial markets and the proportion of early-stage ventures is likely to be 
observed. 
This result is reinforced by the sharp fall in the left-hand side of the inequality that 
follows a slump in financial markets. Indeed, the reliability ratio ρ = (r/w) measures the 
confidence with which the VC decides to enlarge its repertoire of actions to early-stage 
ventures. Taking into account the empirical positive influence of financial markets on early-
stage ventures recalled above, we can legitimately suppose that an improvement (respectively 
a degradation) of a performance index of financial markets will induce, all other things being 
equal, an increase (respectively a fall) in the level of ρ. 
Note however that a rise in confidence will have an observable influence on the level of 
VCs’ early-stage investment if and only if ρ exceeds the tolerance limit T. It is obvious that 
the latter situation (where ρ > T) applies all the better if the tolerance limit T reaches a low 
level. This will be typically observed whenever venture capitalists form expectations after a 
long period in which no financial crises has occurred. Indeed, in these circumstances, the 
probability (1- Π) will gradually decline (if disaster myopia apply) or will be treated as if it 
were zero (according to threshold heuristic). 
From the above argument, we infer the following hypothesis: 
H2 (“disaster myopia”): If the confidence of VCs toward early-stage investment is 
high enough and/or if sufficient time elapses since the last financial turmoil, the improved 
performance of financial markets will induce a rise in the proportion of early-stage ventures 
in the investment portfolio of VCs. In other words, after a long period of “financial 
tranquility”, a positive correlation between the performance of financial markets and the 
proportion of early stage ventures is likely to be observed. 
15 
 
Otherwise, if the increase in ρ is not sufficient to reverse the reliability condition, an 
improvement in the performance of financial markets will not have any observable positive 
effect on VCs’ early-stage investments. It will be notably the case in our model as long as the 
image of a slump in financial markets is still present in the memory of VCs, which maintains 
the probability (1- Π) at a high level and thus also the tolerance limit T. Hence the following 
hypothesis: 
H3 (“memory effect”): Even if the performance of financial markets improves after a 
slump, the proportion of early-stage ventures in the portfolio of VCs stays durably at a low 
level as long as the memory of the slump influences the expectations of VCs: no correlation 
between the performance of financial markets and the proportion of early-stage ventures is 
likely to be observed. 
The next section is designed to test empirically our three hypotheses.  
 
3. Statistical analysis  
We develop below a statistical analysis of investment choices in the United States venture 
capital market. First, we test empirically the relationship between the proportion of funds 
invested in the early-stage and the performance of financial markets (3.1). Secondly, we 
compare the results of the statistical analysis to those of our theoretical model (3.2). 
 
3.1. Early- versus later-stage investment: the example of the United States market 
We use venture capital data from the MoneyTree Report, the database of NVCA 
(National Venture Capital Association)-PriceWaterhouseCoopers. The MoneyTree Report 
measures cash-for-equity investments by the professional venture capital community in 
private emerging companies in the United States. These quarterly data provide information 
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about investments (such as amounts invested, number of deals, sector and stage of 
development) in the US venture capital industry.  
In accordance with the literature on ventures’ stages of development and with the 
remarks made in the first part of this paper, the risk of loss associated with venture capital 
investment decreases as the venture reaches later stages of development. Thus, we put 
together two categories of the MoneyTree Report, “early-stage” and “expansion-stage” where 
the profitability of the product is relatively uncertain, in one and the same category 
representative of “early-stage/high-risk investments”6. For the same reason, we consider the 
MoneyTree Report “later-stage” as representative of “later-stage/low-risk investments”7. 
Table 1 reports the proportion of funds invested in the different stages of development 
and the Nasdaq Composite Index during the period 1995-2008. On this chart, time is on the 
horizontal axis, the percentage of funds invested on the left-vertical axis and the Nasdaq 
Composite Index value on the right-vertical axis. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
                                                 
6
 Clearly, the level of risk is not homogenous between early- and expansion- stages. “Early-Stage: the company 
has a product or service in testing or pilot production. In some cases, the product may be commercially available. 
May or may not be generating revenues. Usually in business existing for less than three years. Expansion-Stage: 
Product or service is in production and commercially available. The company demonstrates significant revenue 
growth, but may or may not be showing a profit. Usually in business existing for more than three years” (NVCA, 
MoneyTree Report). Nevertheless, what is important for our argument is that both early and expansion-stage 
investment are riskier than later-stage investments.  
7
 “Later-Stage: Product or service is widely available. Company is generating on-going revenue; probably 
positive cash flow. More likely to be, but not necessarily profitable. May include spin-outs of operating divisions 
of existing private companies and established private companies” (NVCA, MoneyTree Report). 
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The Nasdaq Index trend may be divided into three periods: bubble (1995-1 to 2000-3), 
fall (2000-4 to 2003-1) and growth (after 2003-1). We must note that this growth has come to 
a halt since 2007-4. 
It can be seen that after a steady increase from 1995 to 2000, the proportion of funds 
invested in “high risk” stages decreases after the Stock Market Crash of 2000. The minimum 
is reached for the third quarter of 2005. After that time an irregular trend appears. 
After years of stability, investments in the “low-risk” stage begin to climb after the 
Stock Market Crash of 2000. A peak is obtained for the third quarter of 2005. At this time the 
proportion of funds invested in the “low-risk” stage is higher than the proportion of funds 
invested in “high risk” stages. 
Table 1 also clearly shows that the Stock Market Crash of 2000 has deeply changed the 
behavior of venture capitalists. From 1995-1 to 2003-1, funds invested in “high risk” stages 
and the Nasdaq Index seem to be linked. On the other hand, the Stock Market’s recovery after 
2003 does not seem to affect the evolution of the proportion of funds invested in “high risk” 
stages.  
We use a simple regression model to test the link between Funds raised (F) and the 
Nasdaq Index. The specification used is: 
Ft = c0 + c1 Nasdaq Indext + ut  
with ut = ρ1ut-1 + ρ2ut-2 + ... + εt 
Table 1 suggests to study three periods: 1995-1: 2000-3; 2000-4: 2003-1 ; 2003-2: 
2008-4. Tables 2, 3 and 4 report results from univariate OLS regressions for these three 
periods, namely: 
• coefficients of regression estimations ; 
• t-Statistic for statistical significance of the coefficients ; 
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• R² ; 
• F-test value and statistical significance ; 
• F-Breusch-Godfrey test value and statistical significance. The null hypothesis 
of this test is that there is no serial correlation in the residuals up to the 
specified order,  
 
Table 2 here 
Table 3 here 
Table 4 here 
 
3.2. Interpretation of the results  
When comparing the results of the statistical analysis to those of our theoretical model, 
it is possible to highlight a break in the investment behavior of venture capitalists in recent 
years. 
First of all, during the period 1995-2002, Nasdaq is a strongly significant explanatory 
variable for the early-stage investments of VCs. The reasons for the adoption of this 
investment behavior are nevertheless different according to the considered sub-period. Indeed, 
between 1995 and 2000, that is before the e-crash, the “disaster myopia hypothesis” applies: 
the positive correlation between financial markets and investment is explained by an increase 
in confidence due to the improvement in Nasdaq performance. The minimum threshold of the 
reliability ratio, T, is low because venture capitalists, in the absence of recent unfavorable 
shocks, consider that the probability of occurrence of an unfavorable event on the venture 
capital market is low. The reliability condition of our model is thus such as ρ > T and a rise in 
the proportion of early-stage ventures in VCs’ investment portfolio is logically observed, in 
accordance with hypothesis H2.  
19 
 
On the other hand, during the second sub-period, between 2000 and 2002, immediately 
after the e-crash, the consequences of the adoption of a availability heuristic by venture 
capitalists are fully felt: they lead to a sharp rise in the minimum threshold T due to the “over-
reaction” affecting the probability (1-Π). Since, in parallel, venture capitalists’ confidence ρ 
strongly decreases as a result of the collapse of the Nasdaq, a reversal of the reliability 
condition logically follows. The latter becomes such as ρ < T. Consequently, when financial 
markets collapse, VCs decrease the proportion of early-stage ventures in their investment 
portfolio, in accordance with hypothesis H1. 
Since 2003, Nasdaq has no longer been a significant explanatory variable for early-stage 
investments: despite the favorable evolution of the index observed since the first quarter of 
2003, this kind of investment does not recommence and most funds continue to be invested in 
later-stage investments. In other words, early-stage investments appear to have disconnected 
from the performance of financial markets. Our model provides an explanation for this break 
in the behavior of VCs: despite the favorable evolution of the Nasdaq, which has contributed 
to the improvement in confidence ρ since the first quarter of 2003, the memory of e-crash is 
still present in the minds of investors. Indeed, the “memory-effect” associated with the 
availability heuristic used by venture capitalists maintains at a high level their estimate of the 
probability (1-Π) and, therefore, the minimum ratio of reliability, T. Consequently, in spite of 
the increase in ρ, the reliability condition is not reversed and remains such as ρ < T. A 
situation where the proportion of early-stage ventures in the portfolio of VCs remains durably 
at a low level is observed, in accordance with hypothesis H3. 
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Conclusion 
In recent years, venture capital investments in the United States have been 
characterized by three successive and clearly defined periods. Firstly, before the e-crash, a 
favorable period for early-stage ventures during which the proportion of funds obtained by 
this kind of firm increased regularly and significantly compared to funds allocated to more 
mature companies. Then, immediately after the e-crash, came a period during which the 
proportion of investment in early-stage ventures collapsed. Finally, from 2003, a period 
during which early-stage ventures underwent a lasting rationing by venture capitalists, the 
latter favoring the funding of more mature businesses.  
Our paper gives a degree of explanation for this phenomenon by analyzing the specific 
behavior of venture capitalists which is essential for an understanding of their early-stage / 
later-stage trade-off. The originality of our approach consists in considering that this trade-off 
is strongly influenced by the specific nature of the decision-making environment which 
characterizes the venture capital industry. We show in fact that the portfolio failure avoidance 
strategy adopted by venture capitalists is directly linked to the fact that financing decisions are 
made, on one hand, in situations of strong uncertainty, and, on the other hand, concerns firms 
at different stages of development and thus implying different risks. This particular decision-
making environment makes the investment decisions of venture capitalists difficult to analyze 
using traditional optimization tools. The rational behavior of venture capitalists implies the 
integration within the analysis of elements often underestimated or ignored in most models 
based on information asymmetries in a mere environment of probabilistic risk. Among these 
elements omitted in the literature, we have focused on key features such as confidence and 
specific heuristic procedures used by venture capitalists in situations of uncertainty. 
The main result of our paper is that these elements strongly influence the way venture 
capitalists interpret the signals emitted by financial markets and echo these signals on their 
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investment portfolio diversification in terms of the investees’ stages of development. During 
certain periods, changes in the confidence of venture capitalists affect the relative amount of 
investment in early-stage ventures. In this case, we found that, in accordance with the 
conclusions of the literature on the determinants of venture capital, one observes a positive 
correlation between early-stage investments and the performance of financial markets. On the 
other hand, during other periods, such as the recent period, the heuristic procedures used by 
venture capitalists render their investment behavior more “rigid”. They then durably refocus 
their activity on the least risky forms of investment, namely later-stage investment. In that 
case, contrary to the results of the literature, there is no observable relationship between 
performance of financial markets, confidence of venture capitalists and investment in early-
stage ventures.  
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Table 1  
The early/later stage trade-off and the financial market performance 
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Table 2 
Regression Result 
Period 1995-1: 2000-3. 
Early/Expansion Funds 
Independent Variable Regression Coefficient 
  
t-Statistic 
C 0.695203 
 
29.17*** 
Nasdaq Index 0.000221 
 
2.82** 
AR(1)  0.177220 
 
      0.72 
AR(2)  0.023984 
 
      0.11 
R² 
 
     0.283  
F 
 
4.500**  
F Breusch Godfrey 
  
  1.720***   
 
* Significant at 10 percent 
** Significant at 5 percent 
*** Significant at 1 percent 
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Table 3 
Regression Result 
Period 2000-4: 2003-1 
Early/Expansion Funds 
Independent Variable Regression Coefficient 
  
t-Statistic 
C 0.672395 
 
25.79*** 
Nasdaq Index 0.000368 
 
3.55** 
AR(1)              - 0.152396 
 
    - 0,51 
AR(2)              - 0.473523 
 
    - 1,27 
R² 
 
      0.586  
F 
 
 2.887*  
F Breusch Godfrey 
  
     0.531***   
 
* Significant at 10 percent 
** Significant at 5 percent 
*** Significant at 1 percent 
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Table 4 
Regression Result 
Period 2003-2: 2008-4 
Early/Expansion Funds 
Independent Variable Regression Coefficient 
  
t-Statistic 
C  0.745541 
 
    5.88*** 
Nasdaq Index             -  0.000629 
 
    -  1.40 
AR(1)                 0.358445 
 
    -  0.51 
AR(2)                 0.167898 
 
       1.59 
AR(3)              -  0.005315 
 
    -  0.02 
R² 
 
      0.362  
F 
 
  4.119**  
F Breusch Godfrey 
  
    0.547***   
 
* Significant at 10 percent 
** Significant at 5 percent 
*** Significant at 1 percent 
 
